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Tax Deductions for Private School
Tuition: Prospects for Education
Christine H. Kellett*
I. Introduction
At the close of its last term, the United States Supreme Court
announced its opinion in Mueller v. Allen,' in which the Court de-
cided that a Minnesota taxing scheme which allows parents to de-
duct certain expenses incurred in educating their children, including
parochial school tuition, does not violate the Establishment Clause
2
of the First Amendment. The five member majority failed to ac-
knowledge that its holding radically departs from precedent and vio-
lates the fundamental principle that public monies should not be
used to support religious activities or institutions. Consequently, the
Mueller opinion appears to be intellectually dishonest and adds fur-
ther confusion to this already unclear area of the law.
Of more immediate concern is the effect Mueller could have on
American education. If Mueller opens the way to the passage of a
federal program of tuition tax deductions, as some believe it will,4
the impact on our public and private education systems will be
disastrous.
II. The Mueller Decision and Establishment Clause Principles
The Burger Court has developed a three-part test for dealing
Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1964, University of New Mex-
ico; J.D. 1975, The Dickinson School of Law.
1. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
2. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S.
Const., amend. I.
3. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White, Powell, and O'Conner.
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and
Stevens joined.
4. For a prediction of the effect that a ruling in favor of the constitutionality of tax
credits could have on Congress, see the discussion by Emerson Elliot, who was integrally in-
volved in the development of the Reagan Administration's education consolidation bill, and
Rick Jerue, Executive Director of the National Commission on Student Financial Assistance
found in League of Women Voters Education Fund, School Finance in the 1980's. 32 (1982).
with Establishment Clause challenges:'
First the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion. . .; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'"
While all members of the Court agree on the articulation of the test,
they have been far from unanimous on the results of its application
in cases involving state or federal governmental assistance to secta-
rian schools.7 An examination of the cases preceding Mueller, how-
ever, reveals several points of agreement.
First, government aid to sectarian schools is not per se unconsti-
tutional. 8 Because these schools perform secular as well as religious
functions, governmental monies may be used to assist them in per-
forming these secular functions.9
Second, aid programs of a non-educational nature, such as
school lunch programs, are usually permissible even in parochial
schools because schools are a convenient vehicle for administering
such programs, which are generally neutral in effect. 10 Nevertheless,
5. Most Establishment Clause cases have concerned schools and can be grouped into two
categories: (1) those involving religious exercises or training in the public schools and (2) those
involving aid to parochial schools. Mueller v. Allen, of course, falls into the latter category.
During the Burger years a number of cases involving aid to sectarian schools have been de-
cided. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971); Levitt v. Committee for Public Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734 (1973); Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977); Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); and Muel-
ler v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1982).
Only two major cases were decided before the Burger years. See Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Thus, the Burger Court, more than any other, has developed the law surrounding the
Establishment Clause as it relates to state aid to parochial schools.
6. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
7. Gerald Gunther wrote in 1980, "Typically, then, the modern Court divides 3 to 3 to 3
in this area: at the most permissive extreme are Justices White and Rehnquist, often joined by
Chief Justice Burger; at the most restrictive end of the spectrum are Justices Stevens, Brennan
and Marshall; in the middle are Justices Blackmun, Powell and Stewart". G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1568 (10th ed. 1980) (citing Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975)). In Mueller, Justice O'Connor, who in 1981 replaced Justice Stewart on
the Court, voted with the "permissive" majority as did Justice Powell. Justice Blackmun joined
the "restrictive" members in dissent. See supra note 3.
8. "One fixed principle in this field is our consistent rejection of the argument that 'any
program which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation'.violates the
Establishment Clause." Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3065-66 (1983).
9. There is also a viable and widely subscribed to theory that any aid to a parochial
school violates the Establishment Clause, a theory not without substantial historical support.
See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
10. Justice Marshall has suggested that the line between acceptable and unacceptable
forms of aid "should be placed between general welfare programs that serve children in secta-
rian schools because the schools happen to be a convenient place to reach the programs' target
populations and programs of educational assistance." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 259
(1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
the articulation of a general welfare purpose is not sufficient justifi-
cation for avoiding a careful analysis of the program and its effects
by the Court.11
Third, governmental programs which aid a school's educational
functions must be carefully examined to ensure that the assistance is
of such a nature that it cannot be used, even unintentionally, in fur-
therance of the school's religious mission. Aid consisting of money or
materials, which could be used for religious pursuits, creates an im-
permissible risk of fostering ideological views. Because this aid has a
potential "religious effect", it is therefore unconstitutional.
1 2
Finally, the form of the aid, whether direct (to the school) or
indirect (to the student or his parents), has no bearing on the deter-
mination of whether the aid will have an impermissible religious
effect.13
In short, a majority of the Court, before the Mueller decision,
agreed on one overriding principle: Government aid that is certain to
have the effect of furthering only the secular function of the school
may be constitutional," but government aid that is either un-
restricted or capable of being converted to religious purposes is un-
constitutional. 15 In the Mueller decision, however, the Court did not
adhere to this heretofore cardinal rule. With Mueller, as one lawyer
put it, the law of church and state appears to be coming
11. Thus, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973), the Court found that aid for maintenance and repairs to ensure the "health, wel-
fare and safety of children" was unconstitutional because it was not and could not be restricted
to buildings used only for secular purposes.
12. For a detailed illustration of the Court's application of these principles to an aid
plan, see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
13. In discussing whether a loan to students of certain educational materials would fare
any better than a direct loan to a school of similar materials (previously found unconstitu-
tional), Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, stated: "Despite the technical change in legal
bailee, the program in substance is the same as before. . .the state aid inevitably flows in part
in support of the religious role of the schools." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977).
The form, however, might have a bearing on the question of entanglement, which the Court
has designated as the third prong of its test in order to guard against either or both of two
results' excessive governmental monitoring of religious institutions and/or potential political
divisiveness of appropriation grants to or for parochial schools. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 622 (1971).
14. Some aid programs might be found to further only secular ends but then be struck
on the grounds of entanglement because they involve the state in excessive monitoring of the
religious entity. See, e.g.. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
15. The one exceptional situation is in the loan of textbooks to parochial school students.
Undoubtedly, books could be used to further the religious function of the school in violation of
principle three. See text accompanying note 5. Nevertheless, the Court continues to allow such
programs principally because of stare decisis. Such loan programs were initially approved in
the pre-Burger Court decision of Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and, while
some Justices would overrule Allen, a majority has decided not to do so. Undoubtedly the
Court recognizes that a reversal of Allen now would work a substantial financial hardship on
sectarian schools.
For the differing views, compare Blackmun's opinion (for the Court) at 236-38 and Mar-
shall's opinion (concurring in part and dissenting in part) at 256-60 in Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977).
"unravelled". 16
The statutory scheme at issue in Mueller was not complex:
Minnesota's state income tax program allowed all taxpayers to de-
duct expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transpor-
tation for their children attending elementary or secondary school.1"
Minnesota taxpayers challenged the statute on two grounds. First,
the program was constitutionally indistinguishable from the New
York program of tax benefits struck down in Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist.1 8 Second, since the program primarily bene-
fited parents whose children attended sectarian schools, it had an im-
permissible religious effect in violation of part two of the Establish-
ment test.19 A majority of the Court did not agree with these
contentions.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that reliance
on Nyquist was misplaced because the facts were distinguishable:
Minnesota's program of "genuine tax deductions" 20 benefiting "all
parents"2 was considerably different from the New York program,
which benefited only parents whose children attended "nonpublic
schools."122 Since Nyquist was not controlling, he continued, it was
incumbent on the Court to determine if Minnesota's statute had a
religious effect. Acknowledging that the "financial assistance pro-
vided to parents ultimately has an economic effect comparable to
that of aid given directly to the schools attended by their children", 3
he nevertheless found the indirectness of the aid significant, and as-
serted that "the attenuated financial benefit" that "ultimately flows
to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at issue"
is not the kind of state aid which the "historic purposes" of the Es-
tablishment Clause were intended to prohibit. 4 Nor would the Court
find, he concluded, that the primary beneficiaries of this tax law
were necessarily sectarian schools, even though the evidence showed
that at the time of trial ninety-five percent of the children attending
tuition-charging schools were attending sectarian schools:
We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutional-
ity of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent
16. Charles S. Sims, attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, as quoted in
Barkash, Court Faces Issues Crucial to '84 Race, The Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1983, A-I, A-
10. Sims' remark referred to Mueller and to Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
Marsh concerned the use of state (Nebraska) funds for hiring a chaplain for the legislature.
17. MINN. STAT. § 290.09 (22) (1982).
18. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
19. See text accompanying note 5.
20. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3067-68 n.6.
21. Id. at 3068.
22. Id. (emphasis in original).
23. Id. at 3069.
24. Id.
to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits
under the law. Such an approach would scarcely provide the cer-
tainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive prin-
cipled standards by which such statistical evidence might be
evaluated.2"
The Court's analysis is unconvincing. Neither indirectness26 nor
facial neutrality27 had previously shielded state assistance programs
from a finding of unconstitutionality. One must ignore reality to con-
clude that tax deductions for elementary and secondary school tui-
tion will not inure primarily to the benefit of religious institutions for
very few public schools charge tuition and very few private schools at
the elementary or secondary level are nonsectarian.28
Nor is the Court's distinction of Nyquist convincing. An exami-
nation of that case reveals that the Nyquist Court's central concern
was not equal treatment of taxpayers or the form of the benefits.29
Instead, the Court focused on a different issue that has been central
in every school aid decision, and which the Mueller Court remarka-
bly did not address: Is the governmental aid, whether direct or indi-
rect, conditioned upon use "exclusively for secular, neutral, and no-
nideological purposes?"
The answer is obvious: The aid generated by tax deductions is
not only not channeled to advance merely the secular purposes of a
school, but such aid is directly proportional to the sum spent for the
costs of the secular and religious educations combined, and may in-
crease even if only the cost of the religious education increases. The
majority avoided this issue altogether, for the recognition of this fact
would have compelled one of two results-either a holding of uncon-
stitutionality or a departure from Nyquist and other prece-
dents-results from which these five justices who favor both aid to
25. Id. at 3070.
26. Thus, in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), grants to
parents did not constrain the Court from finding "the effect of the aid is unmistakably to
provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions." Id. at 783 (footnote
omitted). Furthermore, in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), when considering a loan
of materials to children rather than schools, the Court stated: "Appellees seek to avoid Meek
[v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)] by emphasizing that it involved a program of direct loans
to nonpublic schools. In contrast, the material and equipment at issue under the Ohio statute
are loaned to the pupil or his parent. In our view, however, it would exalt form over substance
if this distinction were found to justify a result different from that in Meek." Id. at 250.
(citation supplied). See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
27. Although equal treatment of public school children has been a first concern of the
Court and facial neutrality is a requirement of permissible aid statutes, some attempts to
render equal aid to nonpublic schools have been struck when the Court was not certain the aid
would be used only for secular purposes. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
28. In 1978, 5,084,000 children attended private schools in the United States. Of those,
only 747,000 or 12% attended non-sectarian schools. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 1981 (102nd Ed.) at 148 (Table 244).
29. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973).
parochial school and strict adherence to stare decisis ° apparently
did not want to choose. The result, nevertheless, is the latter:
For the first time, the Court has upheld financial support for
religious schools without any reason at all to assume that the
support will be restricted to the secular functions of those
schools and will not be used to support religious instruction. This
result is flatly at odds with the fundamental principle that a
State may provide no financial support whatsoever to promote
religion. As the Court. . .has often repeated, 'No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion'."
III. The Ramifications of the Mueller Decision for Private & Pub-
lic Education
Since the election of Ronald Reagan, there has been a move in
Congress to allow federal income tax deductions for private school
tuition. 2 The American educational system as we know it-a system
of quality public schools in healthy competition with independent
private schools-would be severely harmed by the passage of such a
program.
A. The Effect on Public Schools
Today, because of declining birth rates, the American public
school system is facing a problem which it has not had to face
30. The votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and White could have been
predicted with near certainty. See supra note 6. Justice O'Connor who had not previously
participated in such cases, nevertheless, has in other cases shared ideological views somewhat
in line with the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist and thus her vote was not a surprise.
Justice Powell was, therefore, the "swing vote." One cannot help but note that Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion relies heavily on quotations from prior opinions by Justice Powell, perhaps in an
effort to sway his vote. One can only speculate that Powell, a member of the Richmond School
Board for a number of years, was influenced by the reasons he stated in Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977). "Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have pro-
vided an educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome
competition with our public schools; and in some States they relieve substantially the tax bur-
den incident to the operation of public schools." Id. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The Burger Court has often been characterized as an adherent to stare
decisis. See, e.g., V. BLASI, THE BURGER COURT-THE COUNTER REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
(1983).
31. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3078 (Justice Marshall joined by Justices Brennan, Black-
mun, and Stevens, dissenting) (citations omitted).
32. The Reagan Administration has been a proponent of such deductions. See, State of
the Union Address, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 105, 109 (Jan. 31, 1983). This position
caused Rick Jerue, Executive Director of the National Commission on Student Financial As-
sistance to comment: "I find it highly ironic, however, that an administration that is talking
about cutting federal education aid by 25 percent at the same time would propose a $5 billion
spending program for tuition tax credits. But, strange things happen." League of Women Vot-
ers Education Fund, School Finance in the 1980's 32 (1982).
before--declining enrollments. 8 While in the past the central con-
cern of many of the nation's school boards was how to deal with
growth, the most pressing problem of the 80's is how to deal with a
reduced student population. At first blush, this may seem to be a
simple problem but in an era of increasing fixed costs84 and state and
federal funds which are allotted on a per capita basis, local school
boards are caught in a budget squeeze. Fewer students are not neces-
sarily less expensive to educate. Furthermore, decisions to close
schools, fire teachers, and reduce programs are neither popular nor
easy.
The public schools face a second and far more serious prob-
lem-a shrinking political constituency. At one time, a majority of
the populace had a personal connection with the community school.
Today that majority has shrunk to a minority, due in part to the
decreasing school population but also exacerbated by the increased
mobility of the American family,3 ' the increase in single-parent
households, 6 and the breakdown of the extended family.3 7 While it
does not necessarily follow that the lack of a personal tie means a
lack of interest, the decline in public support for schools is evidenced
dramatically by the failure of major bond issues"8 and the failure of
education to attract the interest of legislators. 9
A program of tuition tax deductions will only aggravate these
two problems. Even now, as the total school population is declining,
the private school population is increasing. 0 Spurred on by tax in-
33. The number of children in school reached its peak in 1971 and then began to de-
cline, dropping 9.8% by 1980. Elementary and secondary school age populations are now level-
ing off; higher education will feel the impact of this decline in the 80's. National Center for
Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 37 (1981).
34. Two major expenditures for schools are transportation and utilities, neither of which
is significantly changed by pupil population, and both of which have greatly increased with
spiraling energy costs. For example, in 1980-81, the Gettysburg (Pa.) Area School District's
expenditure for transportation increased 38% while its pupil population decreased. Gettysburg
Area School District, 1980-81 Budget, (1980).
35. Forty-seven percent of the population of the United States moved in the period
1965-1970. U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981 (102d ed.)
at 13 (Table 13). With increased mobility, many Americans no longer live in the community
where they went to school and thus that tie is broken.
36. In 1980, less than 77% of all school age children lived with both parents. U.S. Bu-
reau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981 (102d ed.) at 49 (Table 73).
37. This breakdown reduces the number of grandparents who feel a tie to schools.
38. The percentage of major bond issues that gained public approval reached a record
low in 1980. The percentage then increased but still is not at former levels. National Center
for Education Statistics. Digest of Ed. Statistics. 1981, Table 65, 75.
39. "We get a sense that it is becoming increasingly difficult to attract bright, active and
ambitious legislators to education. Education committee chairmen are complaining that they
cannot get the kind of people they want to include on their committees. Why? Legislators
sense education is decreasing in popularity-it is a 'downer' to have to cut education programs.
In the 1960's, education was a growth field, but no longer." S. Fuhrman & A. Rosenthal,
Relections on the State Politics of Education in SCHOOL FINANCE IN THE 1980s (League of
Women Voters Education Fund 1982).
40. National Center-for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 1981 Table
centives, more families will find private education affordable and
withdraw their children from public schools, reducing the present en-
rollments even further. Especially in cities, upper class whites and,
more unfortunately, upper class blacks41 will abandon the public
schools, a phenomenon taking place even now.42 The impact on the
public school's constituency will be even more severe than one of just
numbers. An increase in private school subscriptions will, in some
measure, "skim off" those parents who have been most active in
pushing for solutions to the problems of the public schools.43 It is
ironic, indeed, that the Court which has pushed so hard for an end to
the dual school system divided along racial lines'4  has opened the
way for a dual school system divided along economic lines.
B. The Effect on Private Schools
Just as the proponents of strong public schools have vigorously
lobbied against tuition tax credits," the proponents of private educa-
tion have actively sought them." While there is no doubt that such a
program will give a financial boost to private schools, that boost will
not be without its drawbacks. Deductions come with conditions, and
such conditions are not always palatable, as was made abundantly
clear in Bob Jones University v. United States and Goldsboro Chris-
tian Schools, Inc. v. United States,'7 a decision announced just five
weeks before Mueller.
In Bob Jones-Goldsboro, the corporate petitioners, who oper-
ated church-related schools, contested the loss of their tax exempt
status" and the concurrent loss to their donors of the tax deductibil-
ity of their contributions to the schools. 49 The Internal Revenue Ser-
i, at 6.
41. A major concern of educators has been the lack of black role models for black chil-
dren. This problem has been advanced as one justification for affirmative action programs. See.
e.g.. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Parents of upper class
black children provide such role models.
42. For example, in 1978 in the District of Columbia only 4% of the public school popu-
lation was white, while approximately 25% of the total population was white. U.S. Bureau of
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981, at 32, 47 (Table 36) (102d ed.).
43. Parental interest in education is not a function of economic wealth. However, par-
ents who are better situated economically, especially if the mother is not employed outside the
home, are frequently more actively involved with the schools.
44. The Burger Court, beginning with its decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), has prescribed broad and often unpopular remedies to
end segregated public school systems like busing.
45. The National School Board Association and the National Education Association are
just two of the organizations that have opposed "tuition tax credits."
46. On Nov. 16, 1983, Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan.) introduced a proposal for a tax credit
of 50% of the tuition paid to a qualified private school that met standards prohibiting racial
discrimination. The Senate voted to table the measure which was offered as an amendment to
a minor tariff bill by a vote of 59-38. 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2424 (Nov. 19, 1983).
47. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
48. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954).
49. Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, subsections (a) and (c)(2)(B),
vice had revoked the status because the schools followed racially dis-
criminatory policies. In an unsurprising ruling, the Court upheld the
IRS's position. What was surprising about Bob Jones-Goldsboro,
however, was the Court's opinion, both in its rather curt disposal of
the petitioners' free exercise claim"0 and in its broad statements
about tax exempt institutions:
History buttresses logic to make clear that, to warrant exemp-
tion under [the Internal Revenue Code], an institution
must. . .demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public
interest. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with
the-common community conscience as to undermine any public
benefit that might otherwise be conferred. 1
One cannot help but be alarmed, as Justice Powell was, 52 by the
spectre of "governmental orthodoxy" 53 that this language portends.
While in the past federal tax deductions have been used to en-
courage pluralism and diversity, in the future they could as readily
be used to encourage conformity of thought and action.
Thus, those who lobby for the deductibility of private school tui-
tion must be wary of the Bob Jones-Goldsboro decision because that
status can be revoked if Congress decides that the school's policies
are not "'in harmony with the public interest'" or that the school
acts "in a manner 'affirmatively at odds with [the] declared position
of the whole government.' ,,54 Furthermore, they should note that if
such a program is passed, any school that feels it cannot in good
allow deductions for contributions to § 501(c)(3) organizations.
50. The schools' attack was two-pronged: (1)only Congress, not the IRS, can condition
tax-exempt status and (2), in the alternative, even if Congress had conditioned tax-exempt
status on the basis of nondiscrimination, that policy could not constitutionally be applied to
schools that engage in racial discrimination on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs.
The Court found that (1) Congress has tacitly approved the actions of the IRS and (2)
the government's interest in nondiscrimination is compelling and "substantially outweighs
whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs."
Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2035.
51. Id. at 2028-29.
52. Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, wrote:
Even more troubling to me is the element of conformity that appears to inform
the Court's analysis. The Court asserts that an exempt organization must "de-
monstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest," must have a pur-
pose that comports with "the common community conscience," and must not act
in a manner "affirmatively at odds with [the] declared position of the whole
government." Taken together, these passages suggest that the primary function
of a tax-exempt organization is to act on behalf of the Government in carrying
out governmentally approved policies. In my opinion, such a view of § 501(c)(3)
ignores the important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, in-
deed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints.
Id. at 2038.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2038. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. See also supra note 49 for
complete quotations.
conscience abide by the government's attendant regulations may"
find itself in an uncompetitive position in today's competitive mar-
ket.56 Private education, whose hallmark has been independence of
thought and freedom from undue governmental control, should not
walk heedlessly into such a trap.
IV. Conclusion
In Mueller v. Allen, the Supreme Court approved for the first
time a program of unrestricted governmental aid to sectarian schools
and, in so doing, violated heretofore established constitutional princi-
ples of the law of church and state. In its failure to address the criti-
cal question of whether the tax aid would be used exclusively for
secular purposes, the majority opinion undermines the Court's credi-
bility and further confuses Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
More importantly, legislators who once felt constrained by constitu-
tional considerations might now be persuaded to vote for a federal
program of tax deductions. Legislators and lobbyists should carefully
consider the ramifications of such a program. The future of Ameri-
can education is at stake.
55. One should not conclude that all government interests will outweigh all free exercise
burdens. Nevertheless, no school can be certain that a free exercise claim will succeed. Justice
Brennan once wrote: "'...At some point the school becomes 'public' for more purposes than
the Church could wish. At that point, the Church may justifiably feel that its victory on the
Establishment Clause has meant abandonment of the Free Exercise Clause.'" Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 652 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring, quoting Dicenso v. Robinson,
316 F. Supp. 112, 121-22 (D.R.I. 1970)).
56. In Bob Jones, for example, the school's unpaid tax liability for the years 1971-75
was $489,675.59. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2023. Presumably, the school will need to raise its
tuition to cover the additional expense unless donors make up the difference. Donors whose
contributions are no longer tax-deductible may be hesitant to do so.
